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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STERLING B. CANNON, GEORGE H. MAXWELL,
DAVE DAVIS, ART VAN LUYK, and TERRY
TEEPLES,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

CASE NO. 14378

STEVENS SCHOOLS OF BUSINESS, INC.,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This was an action by five of defendant's former employees for commissions claimed to have accrued after the
employer ceased doing business. The defendant counterclaimed
for sums advanced to the plaintiffs in excess of commissions
earned, and for abuse of process.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The court ruled for all of the plaintiffs; set off advances made to three of them; dismissed the counterclaim; and
entered judgment against defendant for $35,329.74.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant and appellant seeks reversal of the judgment

and remand to the district court with direction to enter
judgment in favor of appellant on its counterclaim for
advances made to the plaintiffs.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant is a close corporation owned by members
of the Stevens family (Tr. 253). For decades they operated
the Stevens Henager Business Colleges in Salt Lake City and
Ogden until December 31, 1973, when the Salt Lake City
college was closed and the Ogden college was sold (Tr. 253) .
Prior to December 31, 1973, each of the plaintiffs were
employed by the colleges for varying periods as "outside
admissions counselors," whose duties including visiting
various high schools, carrying out public relations, and
enrolling students (Tr. 14). Plaintiff Davis resigned in
September, 1973, and plaintiff Maxwell on July 15, 1973 (Tr.
138, 219).
Each of the plaintiffs had entered into employment
agreements with defendant-appellant, Stevens Schools of
Business, Inc. (hereinafter "Stevens").

Sterling Cannonfs

agreement (Exhibit 1-P) was effective April 1, 1972; Art Van
Luyk's agreement (Exhibit 21-D) was effective January 1,
1973; Dave Davis's agreement (Exhibit 23-B) was effective
April 8, 1972; Terry W. Teeplesfs agreement (Exhibit
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29-D) was effective April 1, 1972; and George Maxwell's
agreement (Exhibit 31-D) was effective April 1, 1972.
Plaintiffs Cannon and Van Luyk performed their services
primarily for the Ogden college, while the other plaintiffs
performed their services primarily for the Salt Lake City
college.
All of the agreements were substantially the same.
They contained, among others, the following provisions:
[The employee agrees] To accept as compensation under this Employment Agreement a salary
of $None per
—
plus commissions on tuitions
received by the College from all approved enrollments credited to you under the terms of this
Employment Agreement as follows: 13 1/2% for enrollments taken where the current address is in
Weber, Salt Lake, or Davis counties, and 15% for
all enrollments taken outside these counties.
An additional 5% incentive commission will be
credited to your commission account at year end
in addition to the commissions shown above for
all tuition income over $100,000 paid by your
students during any calendar year (January 1st
to December 31st).
Your draws against this commission will be
in accordance with the attached Addendum A which
is made a part of this agreement by referencec
* * *

IX
In the event this agreement is terminated
by either party and there exists a deficit balance in your commissions account, the commissions
earned from the date of termination forward will
be applied towards the deficit balance until that
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balance has been satisfied. Credit balances on
this commission account after termination can be
drawn quarterly, the draw to be made during the
last month of each quarter permitting the college
to complete the accounting statements and reports
for that quarter.
* * *

I have read and do understand the above Employment Agreement. It is my understanding that
this agreement will remain in force so long as it
is mutually agreeable to both parties. * * *
Addendum A to the agreement provided for "sustaining
draws" of $150 per week, to be varied under certain circumstances.

In May, 1973, the draw for each of the employees

was increased to $1,000 per month, payable $250 per week
(Tr. 254, Exhibit 35-D).
In 1971 and 1972 the colleges were financially marginal
operations.

In 1972 the Ogden college was profitable but

the Salt Lake college was not, and there was a total profit
of $10,000 for both.

In 1973 daytime enrollments were sub-

stantially down from 1972 (Tr. 259), and during that year
Stevens suffered a net loss of approximately $14 3,000
(Tr. 262).
The managers of Stevens found that they could not
compete in Salt Lake City with the L.D.S. Business College
because the church-operated college offered considerably
lower tuitions and refused to raise them, in fact indicated
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that they were going to reduce tuitions (Tr. 28 9) . Although
Stevens's costs had increased, enrollments were falling (Tr,
351).

It was determined that it would be impossible to keep

the Salt Lake college profitable and that it would have to
be closed (Tr. 299). Unable to meet the L.D.S. competition,
Stevens attempted to either buy or sell to the L.D.S.
Business College, but L.D.S. refused to either sell or buy
(Tr. 354).
In the first part of November, 1973, Stevens suggested
to L.D.S. Business College that it might be the subject of
an anti-trust action (Tr. 359). As a consequence (Tr. 438),
in December, 1973, a settlement agreement was entered into
with L.D.S. Business College which recited that Stevens
Schools would no longer operate the Stevens Henager Business
College in Salt Lake City, would use its efforts to encourage present students to become enrolled in L.D.S.
Business College, would refer inquiries to L.D.S., give the
files and records to L.D.S., and make available permanent
records of all students past and present.

Stevens re-

leased L.D.S. Business College, the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints, and all officers and employees from
all liability, claims or demands of whatsoever kind or
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nature, and agreed generally not to compete with L.D.S.
Business College for a specified period, or to sell assets
to others who would be in competition with L.D.S. Business
College.

As consideration for the various agreements of

Stevens Schools, L.D.S. Business College agreed to pay the
sum of $200,000 (Exhibit 13-P).

The Stevens Henager Business

College in Salt Lake City closed as of December 31, 1973,
and has not operated since.
Also in December, 1973, Stevens sold the assets of
the Ogden college to Fahy S. and Ethel B. Robinson for a
basic purchase price of $267,000 (Exhibit 6-P) .

In addition

to the stated purchase price, the Robinsons agreed to pay
"receivables from admission counselors as of 12/31/73 on or
before July 15, 1974."

The receivables as shown on the

schedule to the contract were $5,544.06 owed by plaintiff
Cannon and $3,069.07 owed by plaintiff Van Luyk.
Stevens conducted no operations after December 31,
1973.

As of that date, based on commissions and sustaining

draws, plaintiff Maxwell had a credit balance of $381.53;
plaintiff Cannon a debit balance of $4,674.41; plaintiff
Davis a debit balance of $3,683.28; plaintiff Van Luyk a debit
balance of $3,069.07; and plaintiff Teeples a debit balance
of $5,826.23 (Exhibit 39-D, Tr. 306-308).
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The Robinsons paid the receivables as provided in the
contract (Exhibits 14-P and 15-P).

On or about January 31,

1974, Stevens sent settlement checks to plaintiffs Van Luyk,
Teeples, and Maxwell.

The check sent to plaintiff Van Luyk

(Exhibit 20-D) contained the following endorsement:
Endorsement of this check constitutes acknowledgement of the termination effective 12-31-73,
of my Employment Agreement with Stevens Henager
College dated May 29, 1973, and constitutes
final and full payment by Stevens Henager College to me in settlement of any and all obligations due me from Stevens Henager College.
Signed
The form of the endorsement on the Teeples and Maxwell checks
was the same, except for the date of the employment agreement
(Exhibits 28-D and 32-D).
Plaintiff Teeples signed the endorsement in the form
presented to him, but plaintiffs Van Luyk and Maxwell added
the underscored language to the endorsements so that they
read as follows:
Endorser ["endorsee" on Maxwell's] in no way
agrees that endorsement of this check constitutes acknowledgement * * * and constitutes
final and full payment by Stevens Henager
College to me in settlement of any and all
obligations due me from Stevens Henager College.
The checks were cashed by the three plaintiffs without
having discussed them with Stevens or objecting to the form
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of the endorsements (Tr. 198, 225, 351). Plaintiff Van
Luyk knew he had claims against Stevens, and consulted an
attorney before endorsing the check (Tr. 131). Teeples
didn't agree with the endorsement and knew it was meant to
settle future commissions, but he signed it and cashed it
(Tr. 189). Plaintiff Maxwell felt he had additional claims
and instructed his secretary to modify the endorsement (Tr.
225) .
On or about February 13, 1974, plaintiff Cannon, through
his attorney, made a demand upon Stevens and upon the Robinsons
for commissions earned on tuitions paid to the Ogden school
after January 1, 1974 (Exhibit 19-D).
The demand was not met, and on March 12, 1974, plaintiffs Cannon, Maxwell, and Davis filed what was denominated
a class action against Stevens and three John Does (R. 515) .
During the course of the proceedings, the court ordered
that the matter should not be maintained as a class action
(R. 539) t and Van Luyk and Teeples were added as plaintiffs
(R. 729-732).
The cause was tried before Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Sr.,
without a jury, following which the court found that plaintiffs
Cannon and Van Luyk were entitled to commissions based upon
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tuitions paid to the Ogden school after January 1, 1974, and
that plaintiffs Davis, Teeples, and Maxwell were entitled to
commissions on tuitions that, according to the plaintiffs'
estimates, would have been due from operation of the Salt
Lake college if it had continued (R. 764-765).

The court

found that plaintiff Davis was entitled to $9,397,46, less
deficit balance of $3,683.28, or $5,714.18; that plaintiff
Teeples was entitled to $10,293.60, less $5,826.23, or
$4,467.37; and that plaintiff Maxwell was entitled to $4,371.13,
less $381.00, or $3,990.13.

The court also found that

plaintiff Cannon was entitled to $8,566.95, and plaintiff
Van Luyk to $12,591.11.

It did not make any deductions for

Cannon's deficit balance of $4,674.41 or Van Luyk's deficit
balance of $3,069.07, on the theory that under the contract
between Stevens and the Robinsons, those deficit balances
had been paid by the Robinsons, and it would be "wrong" to
deduct them again (R. 765).
It was the conclusion of the court that the plaintiffs
had a "vested right" in their contracts with the defendant,
and that there was no accord and satisfaction because "the
plaintiffs who executed those checks were not aware of their
rights or were unaware that their claims were in dispute or
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that the schools were being sold and in this regard this
court refers the parties to the case of Bennett v. Robinson
Medical Mart" (R. 766) . Judgment was entered for the balances found to be due (R. 768) .
ARGUMENT
'

•

•

•

I

THE COURT ERRED IN CONSTRUING THE CONTRACTS AS ENTITLING
PLAINTIFFS TO COMMISSIONS AFTER DEFENDANT HAD CEASED TO OPERATE
THE TWO COLLEGES.
Although the contracts in this case contained a provision
for the payment of commissions after the termination of employment , there was nothing in the contract expressly governing
the rights of the parties in event the Stevens terminated
operation of the colleges.

The employment agreement provides

as follows:
In the event this agreement is terminated by either party and there exists a
deficit balance in your commission accountf
the commissions earned from the day of termination forward will be applied toward the
deficit balance until that balance has been
satisfied. Credit balances on this commission
account after termination can be drawn quarterly,
the draw to be made during the last month of each
quarter, permitting the college to complete the
accounting statements and reports for that quarter.
This provision must be read with Paragraph VII of the
contract, which provides for commissions only on "tuitions
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received by the college from all approved enrollments"
(Exhibit 1-P) .
The evidence is uncontroverted that after December 31,
1973, Stevens Schools of Business, Inc., did not receive any
tuitions.

Thus the court is requiring Stevens to pay com-

missions on monies never received by it, something that is
completely outside of the scope of the contractual agreement.
A number of cases have considered the right of agents
to renewal commissions in those instances in which a principal
has either become insolvent or has ceased to do business.
Most of the cases deal with insurance agents, but they are
analogous to the present one, and establish principles which
prevent recovery by the plaintiffs in this proceeding.
People of the State of Illinois v. Peoria Life Insurance
Co. (Harwick v. O y Hern), 376 111. 517, 34 N.E. 2d 829, 136
ALR 151 (1941), was an action by a group of life insurance
agents against a receiver to recover commissions on renewal
premiums paid to the receiver of their former employer,
Peoria Life Insurance Co.

Under the agreements between

Peoria and the agents, the agents were to solicit life
insurance business, and the commissions they were to receive
were to be paid on renewal premiums for various periods of
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years specified in each individual contract.

Many of the

agreements as to commissions on renewal premiums extended
far beyond the date of dissolution of the Peoria company*
All of the renewal commissions had been paid to the claimants
in accordance with the terms of their contracts up to the
date of appointment of the receiver, but shortly after his
appointment the court ordered the receiver to hold all
premium payments received.
In holding that the agents were not entitled to any
commissions on premiums paid after the insolvency of Peoria
and appointment of a receiver for its assets, the Illinois
Supreme Court said:
In contracts which require the continued
existence of the particular person or thing,
the destruction or death of that person or
thing will terminate the agreement. [Citations
omitted.] The agency contracts here in question
were necessarily and as a matter of law dependent
for their continued existence upon a lawfully
continued existence of the Peoria company and the
parties are conclusively presumed to have entered
into those contracts in contemplation of the
possibility of the insurance company's insolvency
and its liquidation under the Insurance Liquidation Act above cited.
Layton v. Illinois Life Insurance Co. (Bachman v. Davis),
81 F.2d 600 (7 Cir. 1936), was an action by an insurance
agent to recover commissions on renewal premiums under a
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written agreement, the insurance company having gone into
receivership and ceased to do business.
Section 21 of the contract provided for commissions "upon
the second and subsequent years' premiums, which shall, during
his continuance as said agent of said first party, be obtained,
collected, paid to and received by the said first party, in
cash, on policies of insurance effected with said first party
by or through said second party."

Section 28 of the contract

provided that if the agent were "duly terminated" without
the agent having violated any of the terms of the contract,
the agent "shall continue to receive the renewal commissions
* * * for as many full years as he may already been paid
renewal commissions hereunder."
The agent contended that the provision of Section 28
for a post-agency commission was not terminable at the will
of the principal, and had been breached by the appointment of a
receiver and the consequent inability of the company to perform.

The court held that there was no breach by the insur-

ance company and that the agent was not entitled to commissions
on renewal premiums.

The court said:

The very nature of the agency contract
impels the conclusion that it must have been
within the contemplation of the contracting
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parties that the company might some day become incapacitated from continuing in the
insurance business. When the district court
assumed jurisdiction over the affairs of the
company and appointed a receiver, we think
this amounted to a termination of the contract
by operation of law reasonably within the contemplation of the parties and not an actionable
breach on the part of the company.
* * *

We think it cannot be said that the
company engaged itself unconditionally to
remain in business for any given period and
thus be in a position to receive the renewal
premiums. The continued solvency of the company and its continued ability to collect and
receive future premiums from.those insured
was one of the contingencies to be accepted
alike by the agent and the company and, therefore, within the reasonable contemplation of
the parties. The success or failure of the
company was of like importance to the agent
and the company.
If it, therefore, be assumed (which we
do only for illustration) that the termination of the contract by the receivership proceeding is the "due termination" provided for
in Section 28, still appellant has the unsurmountable barrier of Section 21—the
actual collection and receipt of the premiums.
We think a fair construction of the contract as a whole indicates clearly that the
right to renewal commissions is conditioned
on the continued existence of the company and
the continued collection of premiums.
In Moore v. Security Trust & Life Ins. Co., 168 Fed. 496
(8 Cir. 19 09), the insurance company had turned over all its
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business and assets to a rival company and incapacitated itself to continue the insurance business.

In addressing the

issue of breach, the court asked:
Does a contract by a life insurance company
whereby, at or after the lawful conclusion of the
term of the agency, it turns over to a rival company all of its business and assets and disables
itself from collecting future renewal premiums
upon its policies, constitute an anticipatory
breach of an agreement with its agents that after
the termination of their agency commissions
will be paid on such future premiums as
collected by the company, which will sustain
an action for the present worth of the future
commissions before the renewal premiums have
become due or been collected?
The answer was "No." The court pointed out that the
agreement required the agents to "devote their time and best
energies to the service of said company," and "pay all the
expenses of conducting the business transacted under the
terms of the contract/1 and noted that there was no provision that they should continue to do so during the term of
their natural lives or during any other specified time.

The

court thought that a like interpretation should be given to
the commitment of the insurance company.

With respect to

that, the court said:
The implication invoked that the contract
was not terminable at will, because it contained
clauses, unnecessary if it was so terminable,
specifying causes for its termination, is too
feeble to withstand the compelling force of the
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presumption that the plaintiffs could not have
intended to surrender control of their own
business and services for life, and the defendant could not have intended to surrender its
right to limit the exercise of its right to
manage, control, continue, or terminate its
business of insurance at will. The existence
of this right in the defendant and its free
and continuous exercise were implied in this
contract of agency, and the plaintiffs took
the chances of its exercise when they signed
the agreement and entered upon their service
under it.
Also holding that there is no implied agreement that a
principal will not cease doing business is Pellett v.
Manufacturers1 & Merchants' Ins. Co. of Pittsburg, Pa., 104
Fed. 502 (7 Cir. 1900); and see Wallman v. United Casualty
Co., 147 F.2d 636 (3 Cir. 1944); O'Hern v. DeLong, 298 111.
App. 375, 19 NE 214 (1939); Annotation, "Insurance agent's
right to commissions on renewal premiums," 36 ALR 3rd 958,
1018-1023; 3 Am.Jur. 2d, Agency, §57.
In the instant case, the continued existence of the
colleges as colleges was a fact, within the contemplation of
the parties, that was essential to the performance of the
agreement with respect to renewal commissions.

If the college

ceased to operate, the right to renewal commissions necessarily
ended; and Stevens had no duty to continue the schools in
existence.

As in Moore, supra, it is not to be assumed that

the defendant meant to give up all control of the operation
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of its business, to continue the business even if unprofitable, and forego its right to make the necessary business
judgments necessitated by the unprofitability of the colleges.
The fact that Stevens received some money in settlement
of an anti-trust claim from L.D.S. Business College, and
from sale of the Ogden school, has no bearing upon the
rights of the plaintiffs in this case.

The defendant had a

right to sell the colleges, or close them, or change admission standards, or expel students, or do any number of
things that might have reduced or eliminated commissions
payable to the plaintiffs. Nothing in the contract, express
or implied, prohibits the defendant from exercising its
business judgment with respect to the operation of its
business.
The plaintiffs1 contracts with Stevens gave them rights
to commissions "on tuitions received by the college."

Inas-

much as there were no tuitions received by the college after
December 31, 1973, there is no entitlement to commissions
under the express terms of the employment agreements.
The cases also- hold that where no definite term is fixed
in an agency contract, it is terminable at will.

In Moore

v. Security Trust & Life Ins. Co., 168 Fed. 496, (8 Cir. 1909),
supra, the court distinguished cases in which there was a
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fixed term, saying (at page 503) :
* * * an implication that the company
will continue its business for the agreed
term of the agency may inhere in such a
time contract, while it does not in a contract of agency at will * * *.
Accord:

Hollweg v. Schaefer Brokerage Co., 197 Fed. 689 (6

Cir. 1912); Wheeler v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 227 Fed. 369,
373 (8 Cir. 1915); Forbis v. Educators Automobile Ins. Co.,
289 F.Supp. 667, 669 (D.C.W.D. Okl. 1965); 2 Restatement of
Agency 2d §450, comment a.
In this case there was no agreement to continue the
agency for a definite term.

Article IX of the Employment

Agreement (Exhibit 1-P) provides that "this agreement will
remain in force so long as it is mutually agreeable to both
parties."

This created an agency at will, and no liability

resulted when it was terminated by defendant's cessation of
business.
II . '.\
THE COURT'S FINDING WITH RESPECT TO AN ACCORD AND
SATISFACTION IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE.
The court's Finding of Fact No. 11 (R. 765) reads as
follows:
So far as the defendant's claim of accord
and satisfaction or release in full, whatever
terminology one desires to use, the court is
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of the opinion that there was no accord and satisfaction, release or settlement in full by the
endorsement of the checks in question upon the
grounds and for the reasons that the plaintiffs
who executed those checks were not aware of their
rights or were unaware that their claims were in
dispute or that the schools were being sold and
in this regard the court refers the parties to the
case of Bennett v. Robinson Medical Mart.
This finding is relative to the defendant's claim that
plaintiffs Davis, Teeples and Maxwell, were bound by the
endorsement agreement on checks sent to them by Stevens,
which agreement read as follows:
Endorsement of this check constitutes acknowledgement of the termination effective
12-31-73, of my Employment Agreement with
Stevens Henager College dated [date], and
constitutes final and full payment by Stevens
Henager College to me in settlement of any and
all obligations due me from Stevens Henager
College.
The three plaintiffs testified about what they knew and
did not know at the time they received the checks.
Plaintiff Van Luyk testified that the endorsement was
on the check when it was received and that he signed it. He
also testified that at the time he cashed the check he added
the words "endorser in no way agrees that" at the top of the
endorsement; that he had asked an attorney about the added
language; that the attorney "didn't think it would make any
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difference but it would be all right to put it on there";
that the check was received on or about February 1, 1974;
and that at the time he received the check he was aware that
he had claims against Stevens (Tr. 131, 132).
Plaintiff Teeples testified that the check had been
submitted to him; that an endorsement had been placed upon
the check; that the endorsement was an attempt on the part
of Stevens to wipe out the sums of future commissions; that
he was shocked and "cashed the check anywayf" though he did
not agree that future commissions were wiped out (Tr. 189) .
Prior to the sending of the check, near the end of 1973, he
had a discussion with Wells Stevens in which Mr. Stevens
said that they were willing to waive the deficit balance in
return for Mr. Teeples waiving his claims (Tr. 199). Before
cashing the check Mr. Teeples did not inform defendant of any
objection to it.
Plaintiff Maxwell testified that he received the check
and instructed his secretary to add the words "endorser
doesn't agree" at the top of the check, but she mistakenly
typed "endorsee" instead of "endorser."

Mr. Maxwell did not

contact anyone representing the Schools before adding the
words "endorsee in no way agrees that" at the top of the
endorsement.

The check was received sometime during the
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first part of February, at which time Mr. Maxwell believed
that he had additonal claims for commissions against the
defendant (Tr. 229).
Notwithstanding the testimony that the checks were received in February, more than a month after Stevens had sold
the Ogden college, Finding No. 11 was that the plaintiffs who
executed those checks were not aware that the schools were
being sold.

But Mr. Van Luyk had been working at the Ogden

college and went to work for the Robinsons when the sale was
consummated.

Mr. Teeples went to work for Mr. Robinson on

January 2, 1974, a month before the check was presented to
him (Tr. 60). It would have made no difference whether plaintiff Maxwell knew that the Ogden college was being sold.

He

had nothing to do with it (Tr. 223).
And in the face of the testimony of the plaintiffs that
they were aware that they had claims against the defendant,
the court found they "were not aware of their rights or were
unaware that their claims were in dispute."

There is no

evidence in the record to suggest that they were not aware
of their rights; and it makes no difference whether they were
aware that the claims were in dispute.
offered and what they claimed.
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They knew what was

Ill
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD THAT THE CLAIMS OF PLAINTIFFS
VAN LUYK, TEEPLES, AND MAXWELL HAD BEEN DISCHARGED BY ACCORD
AND SATISFACTION.
When there is a dispute or uncertainty as to how much is
owed on a debt, the parties may agree that the creditor will
accept less than his total claim as a compromise in satisfaction of the debt.

The agreement becomes a new contract.

Tates,

Inc., v. Little America Refining Company, 535 P.2d 1228, 122930, (Utah 1975).

For a payment to constitute an accord and

satisfaction (1) the amount owed must be in dispute or uncertain, and (2) there must be an agreement that the payment
shall constitute full satisfaction of the debt.
In this case the amounts due to plaintiffs were uncertain;
in fact, it was and is uncertain whether they have any valid
claims at all.

Sums were owed to Stevens for advances, and

the claims for future commissions were in doubt.

The only re-

maining question is whether there was the necessary agreement.
In cases in which this court has failed to find an accord
and satisfaction, it has stressed the fact that there was no
express, unambiguous agreement that the payment was to constitute full satisfaction.
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In Tates, supra, the debtor tried to prove an agreement by a conversation and a letter, followed by the cashing
of the payment check.

The court found the circumstances

ambiguous, not clearly showing that the creditor understood
or agreed to a settlement.

The court believed it significant

that the check did not bear "payment in full" or words of
similar import.

(535 P.2d at 1231).

This court again stressed the importance of an express
agreement in Hintze v. Seaich, 20 Utah 2d 275, 437 P.2d 202
(1968), where the debtor tried to prove an accord and satisfaction through acceptance and cashing of the check by the
creditor.

The court refused to imply an agreement, citing

1 Am.Jur. 2d, Accord and Satisfaction §15 for the proposition
that before a check can operate as a full discharge there must
be an express agreement to that effect.
In two other cases this court required that the agreement be unambiguous.

In Bennett v. Robinsons Medical Mart,

18 Utah 2d 186, 417 P.2d 761 (1966) and Oilman-v. Matthew
Ferguson, Inc., 13 Utah 2d 142, 369 P.2d 269 (1962), the statements "Payment in full of the account stated below—Endorsement of check by payee is sufficient receipt11 and "the amount
due in full to complete recent buy-backs" on the checks were
held to be too unclear to be satisfaction of all accounts and
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all claims.

In Dilman the court cites 1 Am.Jur. 2d, Accord

and Satisfaction §31, which states:
In some instances the words "in full payment" or those of similar tenor, do not necessarily import or prove an accord, for it may
be that there is more than one account pending
between the parties.
In the present case, the statement is unambiguous as to
what accounts or claims the checks shall satisfy:
any claims.

all and

This being so, an accord and satisfaction was

reached when each check was cashed, and it cannot be defeated
by unilateral alterations or uncommunicated intent.
It is generally held that the cashing of a check
tendered in full satisfaction of an obligation constitutes
an acceptance of the offer by the creditor, even though he
may object to it. The rule as stated in 2 Restatement of
Contracts §420, is as follows:
Acceptance by a creditor of any performance
tendered by the debtor as satisfaction of a preexisting contractual duty, or of a duty to make
compensation, is not prevented from operating as
satisfaction by the creditor's manifested refusal
so to regard it.
A fortiori, it is not prevented from operating as
satisfaction by a creditor's unmanifested refusal so to
regard it.
Where a creditor receives a check from his
debtor containing the worlds "payment in full,"
"final settlement," or other words of similar
import, it is his duty to repudiate the offer
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and return the check or money remitted within a
reasonable time after it is received if he does
not care to receive it in full discharge of the
indebtedness. (1 Am.Jur. 2d, Accord and Satisfaction §23.)
It is also well recognized by the courts that the crediitor cannot prevent the cashing of the check from operating
as a satisfaction by obliterating the endorsement or changing
its wording.
In Hutchinson v. Culbertson, 161 Pa. Sup. 519, 55
A.2d 567 (1947) the debtor had sent a check marked on the
face and back "payment in full," but the creditor had struck
out the words "payment in full" on the back of the check and
deposited it.

Thereafter the creditor brought an action for

the balance of what he claimed to be due.

In affirming a judg-

ment for the defendant-debtor the court said:
It has been established that if a check
bearing a notation indicating that it is offered in full settlement is delivered to the
creditor, the retention and use of the check
by the creditor constitutes an accord and satisfaction. [Citations omitted.] He cannot
avoid the dilemma of returning the check or
keeping it in full satisfaction by erasing or
obliterating the words which import complete
satisfaction.
A similar obliteration was involved in Deuches v. Grand
Rapids Brass Co., 240 Mich. 266, 215 NW 392 (1927), in
which the court said:
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Nor does it avail plaintiff that, after accepting and before cashing the check, he, without
the knowledge or consent of defendant, obliterated from it the statement of the conditions
upon which it was given. In the case of In
re Estate of Cunningham, 311 111. 311, 142
NW 740, it was said:
"The fact that the words 'in full1 are
erased from the check or receipt by the creditor
does not affect the question whether the proffer
and acceptance of the check constitute an accord
and satisfaction, where the erasure is without
the knowledge or authority of the debtor."
This is the general rule.

See Riser v. Wilberforce University,

33 Ohio L. Abs. 438, 35 NE 2d 771 (1927); Wilmeth v. Lee,
316 P.2d 614 (Okl. 1957); and 1 Am.Jur. 2d, Accord and Satisfaction §22.
Stevens made a clear and unequivocal offer to each of
the three plaintiffs, Van Luyk, Teeples, and Maxwell; the
offers were accepted; and accord and satisfaction resulted•
*v

THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SET OFF AGAINST THE
CLAIMS OF PLAINTIFFS VAN LUYK AND CANNON THE .AMOUNTS DUE
TO DEFENDANT BECAUSE OF ADVANCES MADE TO THOSE PLAINTIFFS.
Under its agreement with the plaintiffs, as modified by
a letter, Stevens made monthly advances to the plaintiffs in
the amount of approximately $1,000.

The amounts were carried

on the books of the defendant company as debts, and were
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treated as debts by the parties and by the court.

The debit

balances of plaintiffs Davis, Teeples, and Maxwell were set
off by the trial court against the amounts claimed to be due
as earnings, but the court did not allow any set off against
the claims of plaintiffs Cannon and Van Luyk.

In its Finding

No. 9 the court said:
It will be noted in determining the amounts
due Cannon and Van Luyk that the draws for which
the defendant was counterclaiming are not deducted
from the total amount the court finds are due Cannon
and Van Luyk. The defendant was very careful in its
preparation of the agreement between itself and Mr.
Robinson in the sale of the Ogden school to make sure
that the Ogden school paid the draws of these plaintiffs in connection with the purchase price. The
same having been paid it would be wrong to again
deduct them.
Why "wrong"?

Neither of the plaintiffs had anything to

do with the contract between Stevens and the Robinsons. The
purchase price was established in a number of ways.
The basic purchase price was $267,000 payable in installments, and the Robinsons also agreed to pay receivables due
to Stevens from Cannon and Van Luyk in the amount of $8,613.13,
a bookstore inventory in the amount of $5,119.63, and prepayments on insurance, maintenance, postage, etc., in the
amount of $3,182.19.

They also agreed to pay certain accounts

payable which were related to the 1974 operations, in the
amount of $3,558.77 (Exhibit 6-P).
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It is difficult to conceive how plaintiffs Cannon and
Van Luyk acquired any rights by virtue of the contract between
Stevens and the Robinsons, to which they were total strangers.
The Ogden college was valued at $350,000 and was sold to
the Robinsons for a total purchase price of approximately
$287,500.

The manner in which the purchase price is computed

has no bearing upon the liabilities of the parties in this
case, and neither court nor counsel has advanced any theory
to support failure to allow the set off other than that to
charge the debit balances would be "wrong."
Defendant Stevens Schools of Business had no contract
with Mr. Cannon or Mr. Van Luyk under which the debit balances would be forgiven.

Plaintiffs had no contract with

the Robinsons under which the sums would be forgiven.

There

is no evidence tending to show that plaintiffs Cannon and
Van Luyk were either creditor beneficiaries or donee beneficiaries under the contract between defendant and the
Robinsons.
Under the provisions of 1 Restatement of Contracts
§133, a donee beneficiary is created if it appears that the
purpose of the promise was to make a gift to the beneficiary,
and a creditor beneficiary is found if the purpose of the
promise "will satisfy an actual or supposed or asserted duty
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of the promisee to the beneficiary."

An incidental beneficiary

is one who is neither a donee beneficiary or a creditor
beneficiary, and as stated in 1 Restatement of Contracts §147:
An incidental beneficiary acquires by
virtue of the promise no right against the
promisor or the promisee.
It would thus appear that no rights are created in either
Mr. Cannon or Mr. Van Luyk by virtue of the contract between
the Robinsons and Stevens.
It may be that the court believed that the obligations
of the two plaintiffs had been either (1) discharged by the
Robinsons1 payment, or (2) purchased by the Robinsons under
the agreement (Exhibit 6-P). In either case, however, defendant should have credit for the payments because they were
made from commissions that would have been due to the two
plaintiffs.
Exhibits 14-P and 15-P are checks and invoices used by
the Robinsons in making payments to the schools.

They show

funds as having been paid from Cannonfs and Van Luyk's "commissions wtr. qtr." and "prepaid commissions."

And Mr.

Robinson testified that the debit balances were paid from
commissions payable to Van Luyk and Cannon, from the tuitions
as they came in (Tr. 38-39).
Thus even if the debit balances of Cannon and Van Luyk
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were discharged or purchased by the Robinsons, they were
discharged or purchased with the commissions claimed in
this action, and the commissions should be reduced by the
amounts paid, $5,544.06 for Cannon, and $3,069.07 for Van
Luyk.

There is nothing "wrong" in that*
CONCLUSION

The plaintiffs were entitled to recover only if (1)
amounts were due under the contract with Stevens, or (2)
plaintiffs suffered damages because of a breach of the contract by Stevens.
No amounts were payable under the terms of the contract,
because tuitions had not been received by Stevens.
There was no breach of the contract because it was
implicit in the dealings of the parties that a condition of
the continued payment of renewal commissions to plaintiffs
was that the defendant continue to operate the colleges.

The

fact that Stevens ceased to operate the colleges was not a
breach of contract with any of the plaintiffs because the
fact that Stevens might someday cease operating the colleges
was within the reasonable contemplation of the parties when
the contract was made.
But even if it were not, the contracts were terminable
at will according to their terms, and no breach occurred
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when the contract was terminated by defendants cessation of
business.
Should the court determine that there was in fact a
breach of contract by Stevens, the disputes with plaintiffs
Van Luyk, Teeples, and Maxwell were settled by an accord and
satisfaction, and Stevens is entitled to an offset against
Cannon and Van Luyk of the amounts of their debit balances.
The judgment of the District Court of Salt Lake County
should be reversed and the cause remanded to that court for
entry of judgment in favor of defendant and against the plaintiff s, no cause of action, unless the court determines that
there was no breach of contract and no accord and satisfaction,
in which event Stevens should have judgment against the plaintiffs for the advances made during continuance of the agency
relationship.
Respectfully submitted,

Bryce E. Roe
ROE AND FOWLER
340 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant
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